BEYOND COERCION: JUSTICE KENNEDY'S AVERSION
TO ANIMUS

Steven Goldberg
Justice Kennedy has argued that a religious display or message on
public ground is constitutional unless it is coercive in some way. He
sharply distinguishes his approach from the endorsement test, which
asks whether the display makes a reasonable observer feel like an outsider in the community. But in opinions outside the Establishment
Clause area, Justice Kennedy has shown a strong aversion to government action that he finds motivated by animus. What would happen
if he confronted a publicly supported religious display that was not
coercive, but was motivated by animosity to members of the community? I suspect he would find a violation of the Establishment Clause;
indeed, I suspect he would move a step in the direction of the endorsement test: he would say that a display cannot stand if it makes a
reasonable observer feel like a pariah in the community.
Justice Kennedy's coercion test is set forth most fully in his opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLO where, unlike a majority of the
Court, he would have upheld the display of a creche on the Grand
Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse. The creche was an
openly religious display "of the scene in the manger in Bethlehem
shortly after the birth of Jesus, as described in the Gospels of Luke
and Matthew." 3 UnderJustice O'Connor's endorsement test, this was
unacceptable because it sent "a message to nonadherents 4 that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community.

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
2 The Court in Allegheny also addressed a holiday display consisting of a Chanukah menorah, a Christmas tree, and a sign saluting liberty. With respect to this display, the majority of the
Court found that the combined display of the tree, the sign, and the menorah did not have the
effect of endorsing religion. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616.

3 Id. at 580.
4 Id. at 595 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The Court was divided as to the constitutionality of both displays. Three Justices (Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall) argued that both displays should be deemed unconstitutional.
Four Justices (Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and White) argued that neither display should be

deemed unconstitutional. Justices O'Connor and Blackmun came down on either side of the
issue, finding that the menorah/Christmas tree display, given its "particular physical setting,"
did not have the effect of endorsing religion but that the crhche display was impermissible.
Thus, the crhche display was found to be unconstitutional by a vote of five to four, and the menorah/Christmas tree display was found to be constitutional by a vote of six to three.
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Justice Kennedy flatly rejected the endorsement test as "flawed in
its fundamentals and unworkable in practice."5 Because the endorsement test requires careful attention to the entire context of a
display, including the presence of non-religious objects that may be
included, Justice Kennedy found that it threatened to "trivialize constitutional adjudication 6 by embracing "a jurisprudence of minutiae."7 More fundamentally, he rejected the idea that the government
could not engage in recognizing religion if that made non-adherents
feel like "outsiders. 8 He gave numerous examples of practices that
he found acceptable but that, in his view, endorsed religion and
made nonbelievers feel like outsiders: presidential proclamations in
support of prayer, "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, "In God
We Trust" on the coinage, and so on.9
Justice Kennedy offered instead the coercion test: the government "may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise."'' The government is free to "recognize and accommodate religion,"" particularly when the "act of recognition or
accommodation is passive and symbolic."' 2 Justice Kennedy was quite
explicit about how outsiders should react when confronted with a religious display on government property: "Passersby who disagree with
the message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or
even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree
with any other form of government speech.' 3
Justice Kennedy has continued to adhere to the coercion test and
to criticize endorsement, arguing, for example, that a public high
school "endorses" a religious club by allowing it to meet on school
premises after hours, but because students are not4 coerced into participation, the Establishment Clause is not violated.
Thus the coercion test stands in opposition to the endorsement
approach. Of course, the contrast is not always as stark as it appears.

6

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 674.

7 Id.

Id. at 670.
Id. at 671-73.
10 Id. at 659. Justice Kennedy also discusses a second limiting principle: that the govern8
9

ment may not, "in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to
religion in such a degree" that it establishes or tends to establish a state religion. Id. (citing
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678(1984)). This second principle is not applicable here.
11Id.
12 Id. at 662.
13

Id. at 664.

Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261 (1990) (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's coercion test does not always result in a victory for the government. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-95 (1992) (finding clergy-delivered prayer during a public school graduation ceremony to be in violation of the Establishment Clause as it has
the effect of compelling a student to participate in a religious exercise).
14
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While Justice Kennedy argues that endorsement requires too many
case-by-case judgments, he says that his acceptance of passive displays
might be called into question "in an extreme case" such as "the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall," because such an "obtrusive year-round religious display would place the
government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion." ' 5 Thus while the coercion and endorsement tests are "theoretically distinct," lower courts at times have
had trouble keeping them that way.' 6 Nonetheless, the coercion and
endorsement tests are typically seen by scholars as rival approaches to
the Establishment Clause."

This standard characterization overlooks an important possibility.
I believe that several opinions by Justice Kennedy outside of the Establishment Clause area call into question his commitment to allowing passive religious displays. In my view, it is not just displays that
Justice Kennedy regards as "permanent" and "obtrusive" that would
trouble him. I believe Justice Kennedy would strike down a passive
display that makes the reasonable viewer feel notjust like an outsider,
but like a pariah. In other words, these opinions show that Justice
Kennedy is deeply troubled by government action that is based on
animus toward a group.
Of course, government decisions based on animus have always
been subject to critical scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
But Justice Kennedy's concerns, as we will see, are not limited to that
Clause, and they are broader and deeper than usually supposed.
Consider the matter of free exercise. Justice Kennedy joined the
Court's controversial decision in Employment Division v. Smith, holding
that a neutral law of general applicability overcomes a free exercise
challenge.' 9 The law in question prevented Native Americans from
consuming peyote, a controlled substance, in a religious observance.2
Yet just a few years later, Justice Kennedy struck down a law that prevented adherents of the Santeria religion from sacrificing animals."
His opinion for the Court found that the ordinance in question was
not a law of general applicability under Smith, but rather reflected
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (KennedyJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Emily M. Gallas, Comment, EndorsingReligion: Drug Courts and the 12-Step Recovery Support
Program, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1063, 1078 n.96 (2004).
17 Id.; see also Edward B. Foley, Comment, PoliticalLiberalism
and Establishment ClauseJurisprudence, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963, 968-72 (1993) (comparing the effects of the coercion and
endorsement tests as applied to the hypothetical creation of a national religion).
18 Allison Moore, Loving's Legacy: The Other Antidiscrimination Principles, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 163, 182-86 (1999) (discussing the Court's treatment of laws enacted purely for the purpose of disadvantaging discrete groups).
19 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79
(1990).
20 Id. at 874.
21 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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"improper targeting of Santeria," 2 because the statutory language was
limited to Santeria religious practices, while excusing many other
types of animal slaughter, such as hunting.3 But a portion of Justice
Kennedy's opinion, joined only by Justice Stevens, went beyond the
statute's terms and argued that the legislation was unconstitutional
because it reflected "significant hostility" by the community toward
the adherents of the Santeria faith. 24 Justice Kennedy wrote that antiSanteria speeches received "cheers" from the ]jublic, while remarks
by the religion's leader were met "with taunts." In sum, he found a
"pattern" of "animosity to Santeria adherents., 26 This approach is
quite striking. It is one thing to cite statements by supporters of a bill
in attempting to discern its legislative intent; it is another to recite the
reaction of the crowd. Justice Kennedy is obviously troubled by the
hatred directed by the community at the minority in its midst.
Next came Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Romer v.
Evans, 7 an Equal Protection Clause opinion. Here Justice Kennedy
struck down a Colorado state constitutional amendment that limited
the ability of state and local governments to protect gay rights. 28 Us-

ing rational basis review, Justice Kennedy found that the state had utterly failed to provide a rationale for its actions: "the amendment
seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects.... "29 There were other grounds for striking down the Colorado enactment; it was Justice Kennedy's use of animus that stood
out.30 As one commentator put it, the use of animus was 'jurisprudentially unnecessary.' ' Just as with the animal sacrifice ordinance,
Justice Kennedy was simply unwilling to accept government action
fueled by animosity.
Finally, and most importantly, we have Justice Kennedy's wellknown opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas.32 Here the Court
22

Id. at 538.

23 Id. at 536-38.

Id. at 541.
Id.
26 Id. at 542.
27 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
24
25

28 Id.

Id. at 632.
See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Equal Protection and Anti-Gay Legislation: Dismantling
the Legacy
of Bowers v. Hardwick, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 243 (1997) ("A careful reading of the
case reveals that the Court took pains to provide an alternative basis for invalidation of
Amendment 2 that was jurisprudentially unnecessary-that animus and a 'bare desire to harm'
a particular group is constitutionally impermissible." (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 634)). Alternate
grounds thatJoslin notes the Court could have used to invalidate the amendment include finding the amendment to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause or to be an infringement
upon a fundamental right. Id. at 237.
31 Id. at 243.
32 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2
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found that a Texas law criminalizing sexual intimacy between samesex couples violated the Due Process Clause. 33 Once again using rational basis
review, Justice Kennedy relied on Romer,34 attacked the
'' 5
"stigma

3

imposed by the law, said the state "cannot demean ''

6

gays,

and concluded that the "Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify
its intrusion into the personal and private life
37
of the individual."

Justice Kennedy's Lawrence opinion goes to remarkable lengths to
recognize the religious and moral bases of the Texas statute, before
concluding that these rationales cannot justify criminalizing sexual
behavior:
[F] or centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual
conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but
profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles
to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives.
These considerations do not answer the question before us, however.
The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through the operation of the
criminal law.

8

Once again, we have a striking approach. Justice Kennedy is conceding, indeed stressing, that the ban on gay sex was based on deeply
held moral and religious views, yet he will not allow these views to be
expressed when they amount to animus against fellow citizens.
There is one obvious way to understand Lawrence that side-steps
the question of animus. Perhaps Justice Kennedy is implicitly adopting John Stuart Mill's famous harm principle under which the only
valid basis for making conduct criminal is if that conduct causes harm
to parties other than the actor. 9 Since Texas showed no tangible
harm stemming from gay sexual behavior, it cannot criminalize that
behavior. Under this view, Lawrence would have little to do with Romer, which was not limited to the criminal law, or with the Santeria
case, where the Court said the state could criminalize animal killing
for health reasons; 4° the problem was that religious animal killing was
being singled out.

33

Id. at 578.

"4 Id. at 574.
3

Id. at 575.

36

Id. at 578.

37 Id.
38

Id. at 571.
1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 11
(1984).

40

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993).
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But this reading of Lawrence is implausible. As quoted above, Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the Texas law was based on "proYet Mill's harm principle is itself a
found.., moral principles.'
moral principle. Why should it trump all others? Mill's theory has
4
philosophical rivals and his principle has often been criticized.

Jus-

tice Kennedy nowhere launches an argument that somehow the harm
principle and the harm principle alone is embodied in the United
States Constitution as a limit on the criminal law. Moreover, in Lawrence itself, Justice Kennedy does not seem to be endorsing a Millian
approach. Among the criminal laws called into question by the harm
principle are those that target prostitution,43 yet in Lawrence, Justice
Kennedy goes out of his way to say that the case "does not involve ... prostitution. '' 4

Lawrence is not a philosophical treatise about the limits of the
criminal law. It is a strong, almost visceral, statement that animus is
not an acceptable basis for government action. 45 That is what ties Justice Kennedy's due process opinion in Lawrence to his equal protection opinion in Romer and his free exercise opinion in the Santeria
case.
So how might Justice Kennedy's aversion to animus relate to the
Establishment Clause and the coercion test? Does it suggest that he
might find some passive religious displays on government property
unconstitutional despite his strong language in Allegheny County?
Of course, any answer we might give to these questions is highly
speculative. Supreme Court Justices rule on cases, and a case raising
the point I am urging may never arise. But I believe considering a
hypothetical situation might be illuminating, not only because it suggests that Justice Kennedy would strike down some passive displays,
but because it suggests that in some respects the coercion test is
closer to the endorsement test than is usually supposed.
Consider the following: The majority of the residents of a small
town are outraged by the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence. This
41 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
42

Suzanne B. Goldberg argues that the Supreme Court has often rejected "morals-based"

justifications for law as opposed to "empirical" showings of injury, but she notes that Mill's harm
principle is one moral theory that stands alongside others, such as the Aristotelian approach to
the proper role of government. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-BasedJustificationsfor Lawmaking:
Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1233, 1301-04 (2004). Ernest Nagel has
expressed skepticism about whether Mill's approach yields determinate results. 1 FEINBERG,

supra note 39, at 25-26.
43 2 JOEL FEINBERG,

THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:

OFFENSE TO OTHERS 46

(1985).
44 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
45 1 have argued that this aspect of Lawrence has implications for government efforts to ban
therapeutic cloning. Steven Goldberg, Cloning Matters: How Lawrence v. Texas Protects Therapeutic Research, 4 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'YL. & ETHICS 305 (2004).

Aug. 2006]

BEYOND COERCION

majority harbors an animus toward gay sexual practices. Just as antiabortion demonstrators turn out to protest on the anniversary of Roe
v. Wade each year, this group organizes anti-Lawrenceprograms on the
anniversary of that decision. One year, they persuade the local government to put up a plaque on a courthouse wall for a week during
the period of anti-Lawrence activities. The only words on the plaque
are those contained in Leviticus, Chapter 18, verse 22 as they appear
in the King James version of the Bible: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination." A gay resident of the
community sues, saying that the plaque on the courthouse wall violates the Establishment Clause.
Based on his opinion in Allegheny County, it would appear Justice
Kennedy would have to reject the plaintiffs claim. No one is being
coerced to support or participate in a religious practice. The display
is no more permanent and no more obtrusive than the crche Justice
Kennedy allowed in Allegheny County. As Justice Kennedy said in that
case, the plaintiff can simply ignore the plaque. The fact that it
makes him feel like an outsider is irrelevant.
Yet I do not believe Justice Kennedy would view the plaque this
way. But he would not reject it because he adopts some version of
Mill's harm principle: the plaque, unlike the criminal statute in Lawrence, does not criminalize private behavior.
Justice Kennedy would reject the plaque because it is an expression of animus: it is like the crowd taunting the Santeria believers in
Florida, the voters stigmatizing the equal rights aspirations of gays in
Colorado, and the Texas legislators' animosity toward gay sexual
practices. It is a community saying to some of its members: you are

not only outsiders, you are pariahs, we abhor you.
There may not be doctrinal purity in the notion that aversion to
animus animates opinions under the Free Exercise, Establishment,
Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses. But there may nonetheless be a key to Justice Kennedy's thinking.

